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The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether adding labour
market frictions improves the basic New Keynesian model's ability
to generate greater in°ation persistence and plausible labour market
dynamics. This paper builds and compares two sticky price models,
one of which is augmented by an e±ciency wage model of the
labour market. The e±ciency wage model is motivated by fair wage
considerations, which add a real rigidity to the model that complements
nominal price rigidities common to both models. The two models
are then extended to capture a series of backward looking behaviours
typically used to generate in°ation persistence. The key contribution
of this paper is that the proposed models are estimated using Bayesian
maximum likelihood techniques and Australian data. The results
presented show that by adding real wage rigidity, the models' internal
propogation and labour market dynamics are signi¯cantly improved.
The results also demonstrate that the conclusions made elsewhere
in the literature using simulated models can be extended to models
estimated using Bayesian methods.
Keywords: E±ciency Wage, e®ort, in°ation persistence.
JEL Classi¯cation Number: E24
1 Introduction
There exists a body of New Keynesian literature that attempts to address
the lack of in°ation persistence in sticky price models by adding price
level inertia through nominal frictions and modelling backward looking
behaviour. This paper presents a simple New Keynesian business cycle
model that is augmented by labour market frictions motivated by workers'
fair wage considerations. The purpose of this model is to investigate
whether modelling labour market frictions improves dynamics in the
¤An earlier version of this paper was submitted in partial completion of the
requirements for the degree of Honours in Economics at the University of Adelaide, 2009
yI wish to thank Fabrice Collard for his guidance.
1labour market, and whether the real friction added by the e±ciency wage
component generates greater in°ation persistence.
Dynamic models of the business cycle typically produce labour market
and price level dynamics that do not match observed characteristics.
Standard business cycle models contain Walrasian labour markets in which
wages adjust instantaneously in reaction to exogenous shocks so as to
equate labour supply and demand. These models fail to generate the levels
of in°ation persistence, as well as key labour market features observed in
the data. Structural unemployment is a common feature of all industrialised
economies, wages are sluggish in adjusting to new economic conditions and
households do not always ¯nd themselves on their labour supply schedules.
Models with Walrasian labour markets typically generate employment
series that are less volatile and wage series that are more volatile than is
observed in the data. In addition, these models typically return a stronger
correlation between wages and employment and a more procyclical real
wage than the data allows. These shortcomings are often referred to as the
labour market puzzle.
Business cycle models with unemployment motivated by e±ciency wage
considerations have produced promising results in both Real Business Cycle
(RBC) (Collard & de la Croix, 2000) and New Keynesian environments
(Danthine & Kurmann, 2004; de la Croix et al., 2009). This paper builds
and compares two sticky price New Keynesian models. The basic model
corresponds to the standard New Keynesian framework of a Walrasian
labour market and price adjustment costs (Gali, 2008; Goodfriend & King,
1997). The fair wage model places workers and ¯rms in a partial gift
exchange economy along the lines of Akerlof (1982). In this setting, ¯rms
minimise costs by not only choosing their labour quantity, but also by
posting a wage that achieves optimal worker productivity. It is potentially
optimal for ¯rms to o®er a wage above the labour market clearing rate due
to worker morale and productivity considerations. This setup addresses
elements of the labour market puzzle by giving ¯rms a second mechanism
through which they can react to demand and supply shocks, lowering the
volatility of wages and increasing employment volatility. The form of the
household's labour e®ort function introduces real wage rigidity, improving
the model's in°ation persistence and internal propagation of exogenous
shocks.
To date, the literature in this area has drawn conclusions from
calibration and simulation of similar models. The key contribution of
this paper is that the proposed models are estimated using Bayesian
maximum likelihood techniques and Australian data. The real wage
rigidity generated by fair wage considerations greatly improves the internal
2propagation mechanisms of the model. The fair wage model displays more
sluggish responses in the price level and the wage to exogenous shocks
when compared to the basic New Keynesian model. Similarly, output and
employment show more ampli¯ed responses to shocks. Whilst the fair wage
model fails to match the moments found in the data, there are signi¯cant
improvements on the basic model. Contemporaneous correlations between
wage and employment are weaker and the wage is less procyclical in the fair
wage models. These results indicate that the fair wage models go at least
part of the way towards resolving the labour market puzzle. The results
presented are broadly consistent with those produced by the simulated
models in the literature.
Section 2 presents the fair wage model, along with a benchmark, basic
New Keynesian model and their solutions. These models are then extended
to include a host of backward looking behaviours. Section 3 brie°y details
the methodology of Bayesian estimation and presents the prior distributions
and posterior distribution estimates. Section 4 evaluates the performances
of the models by assessing their reactions to exogenous shocks and the
volatilities and correlations of key variables. Section 5 derives a Phillips
Curve in the style of Phillips' original work and presents it alongside the
typical new-Keynesian Phillips Curve. Concluding remarks are provided in
Section 6.
2 The Models
The fair wage model presented possesses the standard features of a New
Keynesian model outlined in Goodfriend and King (1997), but is altered to
include a partial gift exchange relationship between workers and ¯rms. The
model can be separated into four components: households, ¯nal good ¯rms,
intermediate good ¯rms and a monetary authority. Households consume
¯nal goods, hold one-period bonds and supply labour to and own the
intermediate good ¯rms. The ¯nal good ¯rms combine intermediate goods
through a technology process to produce the ¯nal consumption good. The
¯nal goods market is assumed to be perfectly competitive. Intermediate
good ¯rms operate in a monopolistically competitive environment and face
quadratic price adjustment costs. The monetary authority sets the nominal
interest rate as a weighted combination of a simple Taylor Rule and the
previous period's interest rate. The basic model referred to in this section
is the standard New Keynesian framework without fair wage considerations.
Departures of the basic model from the fair wage model are explained




The economy contains a continuum of homogenous, in¯nitely lived
households uniformly distributed on [0;1]. Households have preferences over
consumption and labour e®ort. Unlike most of the standard RBC and New
Keynesian literature, households do not have preferences over leisure. As
a result, the representative household inelastically supplies an in¯nitesimal
amount of time to each intermediate good ¯rm in the continuum of ¯rms.
In turn, some fraction of this labour is employed by each intermediate good
¯rm. Consequently, the usual labour supply condition that comes from the
tradeo® between consumption and leisure is absent in the fair wage model.
The representative household maximises their discounted expected future


















where E is the expectations operator, ¯ is the discount factor and Ct is
consumption. ¨t is a preference shock that follows a stationary, exogenous
AR(1) process





Dt(i) is a binary variable that indicates whether or not the household is
employed by intermediate good ¯rm i in the current period. Et(i) is the
e®ort given by the household to the intermediate good ¯rm i. E¤
t (i) is the
level of e®ort the household deems is fair. Following Collard and de la Croix
(2000), E¤
t (i) is given by
E¤













This determination of a fair level of e®ort follows from the idea of a partial
gift exchange between workers and ¯rms (Akerlof, 1982). (1) shows that
workers receive disutility from providing a labour e®ort that deviates from
what they believe to be fair. Thus, although workers dislike providing labour
e®ort, they are willing to give extra e®ort to their employer in exchange for
a higher real wage Wt(i). In addition to some baseline or minimum level
of labour e®ort Á0, workers are willing to give extra e®ort in exchange for
a wage premium above the current alternative Wa
t and a social norm Ws
t .
The alternative wage summarises what a worker could earn if they were not
working for their current employer. This term is given by the average of
current wages available in the economy and unemployment compensation,





In the initial speci¯cation of the fair wage model, the social norm is the
previous period wage
Ws
t = Wt¡1: (6)
Survey data in Bewley (1998) emphasises the importance of changes in the
wage rate on worker morale and e®ort. Parameters ° and Ã determine
how responsive a worker's e®ort is to being paid a wage relative to the
alternative wage and the social norm. To avoid heterogeneity between
employed and unemployed workers across time, the existence of costless
insurance contracts is assumed. Workers are risk averse and thus choose
to completely insure themselves against unemployment. As a result, all
households are faced with the same problem in every period regardless of
their employment history.















where Bt is the quantity of one-period bonds purchased in period t, Rt is
the return on these bonds, given by (1 + it), Nt(i) is the fraction of time
spent working for intermediate good ¯rm i, ¢(i) is the pro¯t of intermediate
good ¯rm i and Pt is the price of the consumption good.
2.1.2 Basic model
In the basic model with no labour market friction, households receive















2.2 Final Good Firms
2.2.1 Final Good Firm Problem














where Yt is the output of the ¯nal good ¯rm and Pt(i) and Yt(i) are the price
and output of intermediate good ¯rm i. µ gives the elasticity of substitution
between intermediate goods in production of the ¯nal consumption good.
2.3 Intermediate Good Firms
2.3.1 Intermediate Good Firm Problem
There is a continuum of intermediate good ¯rms uniformly distributed on







where Nt(i) is the fraction of the households' inelastically supplied labour
that the intermediate good ¯rm chooses to employ. At is an exogenous
technology shock common to all intermediate good ¯rms and follows an
AR(1) process





The productivity of the ¯rm's chosen labour input is augmented by the e®ort
Et(Wt(i)) received from each worker. Given the form of the e®ort function
speci¯ed above, e®ort is a convex function of the wage o®ered by the ¯rm.
As the labour market is non-Walrasian, given a level of demand for their
good, intermediate good ¯rms choose their labour input and nominal wage
^ Wt(i) that satis¯es the following cost minimisation problem
min
Nt(i) ^ Wt(i)
TCt(i) = ^ Wt(i)Nt(i); (14)
subject to the production constraint (11). In addition to the cost
minimisation process, ¯rms choose the price for their good that maximises

















where ©t is the ¯rms' stochastic discount factor. As in Rotemberg (1982),
intermediate good ¯rms face quadratic price adjustment costs in adjusting
the price of their good in any way that deviates from steady state in°ation
6¦. The parameter ' indicates how costly price adjustments are. The
¯rm's pricing problem is solved subject to the demand for its good and the
production constraint.
Intermediate good ¯rms can increase their output either by hiring extra
workers or by eliciting extra e®ort from their workers by o®ering a higher
wage. At the optimum, ¯rms equate the marginal cost of extra production
by both means, resulting in the following statement for the optimal level of
worker e®ort
Et(i) = ° + Ã: (16)
It is optimal for the intermediate good ¯rms to induce a constant level of
e®ort from their workers in each period.1 As a result, the model satis¯es
the Solow (1979) condition, which asserts that for a ¯rm to minimise the
cost per unit of e®ective labour, the elasticity of e®ort with respect to wage
should equal unity.
The key feature of the model is that because of the link between wages,
e®ort and productivity, ¯rms can o®er a real wage above the Walrasian rate.
As a result, aggregate period unemployment is given by




As the basic model has a Walrasian labour market, intermediate good ¯rms
only optimise with respect to labour in their cost minimisation problem.
2.4 Monetary Authority
2.4.1 Monetary Authority Rule
The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate through a variant of
a simple Taylor rule. The interest rate in the current period is a function of
in°ation, the output gap and a one period lag of the interest rate
it = ¿it¡1 + (1 ¡ ¿)(Á¼¼t + Á~ ye yt) + ºt; (18)
ºt » N(0;¾2
º); (19)
where ¼t is current period in°ation, ~ y is the output gap and ºt is an
exogenous `white-noise' variable. As in Smets and Wouters (2003), ~ y is
de¯ned as the di®erence between current output and output in an identical
1Note that because W
a and W
s are not ¯xed, holding e®ort constant across time is
not the same as holding wages constant across time.
7economy with completely °exible prices
~ yt = yt ¡ y
f
t : (20)
2.5 Solving the model
A symmetric equilibrium is imposed whereby all ¯rms make the same wage
and employment decisions in every period. De¯ning in°ation as ¦t = Pt
Pt¡1,
the system is closed by the following resource constraint






The log-linearised system is presented in Appendix A. Equations
(25) to (33) determine the nine endogenous variables of the system:
nt;wt;yt;¼t;it;mct;ut; ~ yt and y
f
t . The stochastic behaviour of the system
is driven by three exogenous shock variables: xt;at and ºt. The ¯rst two
follow independent ¯rst-order autoregressive processes, whilst the third is
assumed to be independent, identically distributed.
2.6 Alternative Speci¯cations
2.6.1 Fair Wage and Basic Model II: Hybrid Phillips Curve and
Consumption Habit Case
As in Gali and Gertler (1999), backward-looking price-setting behaviour by
intermediate good ¯rms is introduced into the model. In doing so, a degree
of price level inertia is added to the model. This is achieved by changing the
adjustment cost term in the intermediate good ¯rm's price setting problem












In addition to this, habit persistence in consumption is added by altering
















where e Ct¡1 is the average consumption level in the economy last period.
2.6.2 Fair Wage Model III: Social Norm Persistence
Following Collard and de la Croix (2000), to allow for slower adjustment of
the social norm in the e®ort function, it is re-speci¯ed as a weighted sum of





(1 ¡ ¹)i¡1Wt¡i: (23)
Note that when ¹ = 1, this expression is identical to the previous
speci¯cation of the social norm. Results presented in Collard and de la
Croix suggest that this new statement for the social norm improves the
performance of the fair wage model across the business cycle. As this last
speci¯cation modi¯es the e®ort function, it has no e®ect on the basic model.
3 Estimation
The models presented are estimated using Bayesian methods. This section
brie°y outlines the estimation methodology used and presents the prior and
posterior distributions of the estimated parameters.
3.1 Methodology
Bayesian estimation combines the use of prior information, `inherited' from
calibration methods, with maximum likelihood techniques through Bayes'
theorem. Hence, Bayesian estimation methods have been presented in the
literature as somewhat of a halfway point between full calibration and
maximum likelihood estimation methods (Smets & Wouters, 2003, 2007;
Lubik & Schorfheide, 2004; An & Schorfheide, 2007).
The method can be summarised as follows. Expressing the vector of
parameters to be estimated as £ and the data set as Z, using Bayes' theorem






g(£jZ) is the posterior distribution of the parameters, g(£) is prior
information about the parameters, chosen to re°ect entirely objective or
subjective information, or a combination of both. f(Zj£) is the joint density
of the data, which can also be interpreted as a function that gives the
likelihood of di®erent values of the parameters conditional on the data
f(Zj£) = L(£jZ):
Subsequently, this function is computed using maximum likelihood
estimation. Solving the following problem returns the vector of parameters
9evaluated at their most probable value b L
max
£
L(£jZ) = b L:
Initially, the primary object of interest is the posterior kernel · g(£jZ) which
is equal to the product of the prior distribution and the maximised likelihood
function
· g(£jZ) = g(£) b L:
From this posterior kernel, the posterior modes of the parameters
are obtained. The posterior kernel is also required to build the
posterior distribution. The posterior distributions presented in this
section are generated using MCMC sampling methods, speci¯cally the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with 100;000 draws.
3.2 Parameter Estimates
3.2.1 Prior Distributions
Before discussing the choice of prior distributions used in estimating the
parameters of the model, it should be noted that two parameters must
be calibrated. To remain consistent with the literature, in the fair wage
models N is set to 0.9, giving a steady state unemployment level of 10%.
To allow for the proper identi¯cation of the e®ort function, it is necessary
to calibrate either ° or Ã, or calculate a ratio of the two. Ã is estimated in
order to assess the e®ects of adding persistence to the social norm variable
in the third speci¯cation of the fair wage model. Taking the value from
Danthine and Donaldson (1990), ° is set to 0.9.
The prior distributions presented in Table 1 are common across all
speci¯cations of the fair wage and basic models where applicable. A
reasonably restrictive prior distribution is set for the parameter in the e®ort
function that relates household e®ort response to the social norm. The
prior is set as a gamma distribution with mean 2.2 and standard deviation
0.5. The mean is chosen based on the results in Collard and de la Croix
(2000), which uses the same calibration of °. The mean of the gamma
prior distribution on R is set to 4 to return a value of ¯ that is close to
one. The parameters for habit persistence in consumption and the social
norm b and ¹ are set at 0.5 and 0.8 with standard deviation 0.05 and 0.1
respectively. The prior on b is a beta distribution and ¹ follows a gamma
distribution. The disutility of labour parameter # is set at one with a fairly
loose gamma distributed prior with standard deviation 0.75. The Phillips
curve parameters ± and · are beta and gamma distributed, with means set
to 0.1 and 0.5 respectively.
10Table 1: Prior Distribution of Parameters
Parameter Distribution Mean Std. Dev.
Households and Firms
Ã gamma 2.2 0.5
R gamma 4 1
b beta 0.5 0.25
¹ gamma 0.8 0.1
# gamma 1 0.75
± beta 0.1 0.01
· gamma 0.5 0.2
Taylor Rule
¿ beta 0.5 0.25
Á¼ gamma 1.5 0.5
Á~ y gamma 0.12 0.025
Exogenous Persistence
½¨ beta 0.5 0.15
½A beta 0.5 0.15
Exogenous Shock Variances
¾x inv gamma 0.01 1
¾A inv gamma 0.01 1
¾º inv gamma 0.01 1
The parameters on interest rate smoothing, policy reaction to in°ation
and reaction to the output gap in the Taylor rule ¿, Á¼ and Á~ y are set
with means of 0.5, 1.5 and 0.12 respectively. This is broadly in line with
other estimates of the Taylor rule using Australian data (Nimark, 2007). ¿
follows a beta distribution with standard deviation 0.25, whilst the other
two parameters on in°ation and the output gap are gamma distributed
with standard deviation 0.5 and 0.025 respectively. The persistence of
the exogenous processes are beta distributed with mean 0.5 and standard
deviation 0.15 for both ½¨ and ½A. The priors on the stochastic disturbances
are set identically in order to allow the magnitude of the disturbances to
come from the data. The standard errors of the processes ¾x, ¾A and º are
given loose priors with mean 0.01 and in¯nite standard deviation. They are
assumed to follow inverse gamma distributions.
3.2.2 Posterior Distributions
To estimate the structural parameters of the models presented in Section
2, Australian data from the in°ation targetting period 1993:3-2007:4 for
real GDP, the GDP de°ator and the nominal interest rate are used2.
The real GDP time series is passed through a Hodrick-Prescott (HP)
2Data used comes from the OECD's Economic Outlook database (OECD, 2009)
11¯lter set to frequency 1600. All time series are treated as deviations
from the sample mean. The mode, the mean and the 5th and 95th
percentiles of the posterior distributions of the parameters obtained by the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm for all speci¯cations of the fair wage and
basic models are presented in Tables 2 and 3.
In all speci¯cations of the fair wage model, the estimated value of Ã
appears to be well identi¯ed and signi¯cantly lower than the mean of the
prior distribution. These data suggest that the e®ect of a change in wage
on worker e®ort is less pronounced than those found in Collard and de la
Croix (2000). As expected, the estimates of R return a value of ¯ that is
approximately equal to one.
Consumption habit formation b varies signi¯cantly between the fair
wage and basic models. The fair wage models indicate that modelling
consumption habits has a strong impact on the household's consumption -
savings decision, whereas only a small degree of consumption smoothing is
added to the basic model. The fair wage models return values of b much
higher than other Bayesian models using Australian data over a longer
sample period, whereas the value returned by the basic model is more
consistent with the literature (Justiniano & Preston, 2008). The data
appears to be informative for the social norm persistence parameter ¹ and
returns a weaker e®ect than is found in Collard and de la Croix (2000) .
The basic model returns an extremely high value for the elasticity of labour
supply parameter #.
The low values of · suggest that backward-looking price indexing does
not capture the price setting behaviour of ¯rms in the data. The estimates
of · all fall within the range of values found in Gali and Gertler (1999),
who conclude that price indexing behaviour is quantitatively unimportant.
The high estimated values of ¿ in the Taylor rule indicate that monetary
policy responds very gradually to changes in in°ation and output over
the sample. These policy changes are driven primarily by deviations in
in°ation and respond very little to deviations in output. The small values
for the standard error of the monetary policy disturbance º suggests
that the estimates of the Taylor rule ¯t the data reasonably well. The
strength of the response to in°ation is stronger than is found elsewhere.
However, the degree of interest rate smoothing and emphasis on responses
to in°ation rather than output is consistent with existing Bayesian Taylor
rule estimates for Australia (Justiniano & Preston, 2008; Nimark, 2007).
The estimates of ½¨ and ¾x suggest that the preference shock process
is highly persistent with weak disturbances in the basic models and the
12¯rst speci¯cation of the fair wage model. The persistence of the preference
shock falls signi¯cantly in the second and third speci¯cations of the fair
wage models, indicating the greater internal propogation of shocks in these
models. In both the fair wage and basic models, the standard error of the
technology process possesses similar volatility. However, the persistence
of the process is quite di®erent between the two models. The persistence
parameter is signi¯cantly greater in the basic models. Once again, this is
a promising result as it shows greater internal propogation in the fair wage
models. The fair wage models' technology persistence parameter is also
signi¯cantly lower than other Australian estimates (Justiniano & Preston,
2008; Nimark, 2007).
The log data densities presented at the bottom of Table 2 indicates
that adding backward-looking behaviours to the models improve their
performance.
13Table 2: Posterior Distribution of Parameters in Fair Wage Models
Model I Model II Model III
Parameter Mode Mean Mode Mean Mode Mean
(90 percent interval) (90 percent interval) (90 percent interval)
Households and Firms
Ã 1.01 1.11 1.73 1.79 1.64 1.72
(0.65, 1.56) (1.12, 2.45) (1.02, 2.36)
R 3.70 3.96 3.88 4.02 3.78 4.07
(2.39, 5.52) (2.35, 5.60) (2.37, 5.70)
b - - 0.75 0.71 0.76 0.72
(0.56, 0.85) (0.58, 0.87)
¹ - - - - 0.73 0.74
(0.59, 0.88)
± 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
(0.10, 0.13) (0.09, 0.12) (0.09, 0.12)
· - - 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.12
(0.04, 0.19) (0.05, 0.20)
Taylor Rule
¿ 0.90 0.90 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.93
(0.86, 0.94) (0.91, 0.96) (0.90, 0.96)
Á¼ 2.31 2.35 2.29 2.44 2.14 2.22
(1.61, 3.12) (1.54, 3.27) (1.38, 3.01)
Á~ y 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10
(0.06, 0.13) (0.06, 0.13) (0.06, 0.13)
Exogenous Persistence
½¨ 0.70 0.68 0.26 0.30 0.27 0.32
(0.58, 0.77) (0.12, 0.52) (0.12, 0.53)
½A 0.28 0.32 0.29 0.33 0.27 0.32
(0.12, 0.51) (0.12, 0.55) (0.11, 0.52)
Exogenous Shocks
¾x 0.003 0.003 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.018
(0.002, 0.004) (0.007, 0.028) (0.006, 0.030)
¾A 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.017
(0.010, 0.016) (0.012, 0.020) (0.013, 0.021)
¾º 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002, 0.002) (0.001, 0.002) (0.001, 0.002)
Log Data Densities
724.3 724.5 726.4
14Table 3: Posterior Distribution of Parameters in Basic Models
Model I Model II
Parameter Mode Mean Mode Mean
(90 percent interval) (90 percent interval)
Households and Firms
R 3.74 3.96 3.76 3.99
(2.27, 5.47) (2.36, 5.54)
b - - 0.08 0.15
(0.00, 0.28)
# 4.47 4.77 4.84 5.28
(2.78, 6.66) (3.10, 7.41)
± 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11
(0.09, 0.12) (0.09, 0.13)
· - - 0.16 0.20
(0.07, 0.32)
Taylor Rule
¿ 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.85
(0.79, 0.90) (0.79, 0.90)
Á¼ 1.71 1.83 1.67 1.73
(1.09, 2.53) (1.00, 2.32)
Á~ y 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12
(0.08, 0.16) (0.08, 0.15)
Exogenous Persistence
½¨ 0.68 0.66 0.68 0.65
(0.56, 0.76) (0.55, 0.75)
½A 0.54 0.54 0.47 0.45
(0.38, 0.70) (0.27, 0.62)
Exogenous Shocks
¾x 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.002, 0.004) (0.002, 0.004)
¾A 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.011
(0.006, 0.011) (0.007, 0.014)
¾º 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002, 0.002) (0.002, 0.002)
154 Results
Evaluation of the models' performance is carried out in two stages. The
¯rst is through graphical analysis of the models' reactions to exogenous
shocks. Impulse responses are presented to identify the propagation and
ampli¯cation mechanisms in the models, as well as to support the second
order moments that follow. The second stage of the analysis is the
presentation of the models' second order moments. These moments further
illustrate di®erences in the internal propogation mechanisms between the
fair wage and basic models.
4.1 Impulse Response Functions
Figures 1 and 2 present the mean of the relative impulse responses of several
key variables to one standard deviation shocks to the exogenous element of
the Taylor rule º. Figure 1(a) shows the reactions of the three speci¯cations
of the fair wage model to a contractionary monetary policy shock. The
shaded areas represent 95% con¯dence bands around the model with the
highest log data density, given in Table 2. Figure 1(a) clearly illustrates
that by modelling consumption habits and price indexing ¯rms, that internal
propagation mechanisms of the model are greatly improved. In particular,
output and the two labour market variables display much more sustained
responses to a monetary shock. Adding habit formation in the social norm
does not alter the model's response to a monetary shock in a statistically
signi¯cant fashion. Figure 1(b) replicates the previous ¯gure for the two
speci¯cations of the basic model. Once again, modelling consumption habits
and price indexing ¯rms greatly increases the propagation of the exogenous
shock. This di®erence is particularly noticeable in the reaction of in°ation
to the monetary policy shock.
16Figure 1: Comparing Fair Wage and Basic Models
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Fair Wage Model I
Fair Wage Model II
Fair Wage Model III
(a) Fair Wage Models






























Basic NK Model I
Basic NK Model II
(b) Basic Models
17Figure 2 directly compares the corresponding speci¯cations of the fair
wage and basic models with one another. The response of output to the
tightening of monetary policy in the fair wage models is persistent, especially
in the second speci¯cation of the model. In the fair wage model, ¯rms have
a lower elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output. Relaxing this link
between costs and output allows for a more reactive output series in the
fair wage model. The wage rigidity added by the e±ciency wage component
of the fair wage model is clear to see from the reaction of the wage on
impact in each model. Firms are reluctant to move away from o®ering a
wage that satis¯es the cost minimisation problem for e®ective labour: the
wage that satis¯es the Solow condition. As such, the negative response of
the wage to the shock is much smaller in the fair wage models. Due to
the fall in output caused by contractionary monetary policy, in order to
maintain a clear labour market in the basic models, the real wage drops
signi¯cantly. The wage rigidity caused by workers' responses to changes in
the wage generates the greater persistence in the labour market variables in
the fair wage models. The di®erence in the negative movements in in°ation
from steady state can be attributed to this discrepancy in the behaviour
of the real wage on impact between the two models. The less ampli¯ed
response of marginal cost in the fair wage model makes it optimal for ¯rms
to adjust prices more gradually over time, leading to the persistent response
of in°ation in the fair wage model.
18Figure 2: Comparing Real Frictions
































Fair Wage Model I
Basic NK Model I
(a) Model I
































Fair Wage Model II
Basic NK Model II
(b) Model II
194.2 Second Order Moments
Table 4 presents HP ¯ltered second order moments from Australian data
and those generated by simulated models that take the posterior mean
estimates in Tables 2 and 3 as parameter values. Wage and employment
data are taken from the same source as the data used to estimate the models
(OECD, 2009). There are a number of features of Table 4 that further
indicate that the fair wage models outperform the basic New Keynesian
framework.
The fair wage models' ability to lower the volatility of the wage series
is further demonstrated by the wage to output volatility ratio reported in
Table 4. The basic models generate a wage series close to four times as
volatile as output, whereas the fair wage models generate wage series that
are slightly less volatile than the data with roughly the same volatility
as output. The basic models do a more credible job of replicating the
employment to output volatility ratio found in the data, whilst the fair wage
models produce slightly more volatile employment series. The reported
volatilities of the wage and employment series show that the fair wage
models lower wage volatility and increase employment volatility, which
addresses a well known de¯ciency of modern business cycle models. The
greater volatility of output in the fair wage models largely accounts for
their lower in°ation to output ratios.
The fair wage models that allow for price indexing and habit formation
in consumption and the social norm generate greater output growth
persistence than both the data and the basic models. All of the fair wage
models produce more persistent in°ation and wage series than found in the
data. The entire suite of models fail to capture the level of employment
persistence in the data, however the additional frictions in the second and
third speci¯cations of the fair wage model increase persistence signi¯cantly.
All of the models return an in°ation-output and interest rate-output
correlation that is not found in the data. The fair wage model's correlation
between employment and output further illustrate the e®ects of the
Solow condition. As ¯rms are constrained by signi¯cant wage inertia,
°uctuations in output are largely matched by movements in employment.
Additionally, movements in output are not positively matched by the real
wage in the fair wage models, unlike the basic models. The wage-in°ation,
employment-in°ation and wage-employment correlations illustrate that the
fair wage model weakens the almost perfect co-movement exhibited by
these series in the basic model. The fair wage models do a fairly poor job of
matching the data in these areas. However, by relaxing the assumption of
Walrasian labour markets and dampening the models' response to demand
20shocks, they do represent a signi¯cant improvement on the basic models.
Table 4: Second Order Moments
Aus Data Basic Model Fair Wage
Model I Model II Model I Model II Model III
¾(¼)=¾(y) 0.87 0.61 0.62 0.47 0.58 0.54
¾(w)=¾(y) 2.27 3.99 3.72 1.24 1.28 1.11
¾(n)=¾(y) 0.58 0.90 1.06 1.06 1.39 1.42
100¾(y) 0.60 0.82 0.86 1.20 1.40 1.49
½(yt;yt¡1) 0.59 0.45 0.52 0.54 0.81 0.82
½(¼t;¼t¡1) 0.33 0.19 0.29 0.53 0.69 0.67
½(wt;wt¡1) 0.59 0.20 0.16 0.76 0.85 0.81
½(nt;nt¡1) 0.87 0.25 0.20 0.25 0.45 0.45
½(¼;y) -0.02 0.31 0.28 0.18 0.49 0.54
½(r;y) -0.01 -0.41 -0.54 -0.77 -0.54 -0.54
½(w;y) 0.13 0.39 0.27 -0.15 -0.11 0.00
½(n;y) 0.07 0.28 0.20 0.47 0.64 0.62
½(w;¼) 0.07 0.99 0.98 0.86 0.70 0.74
½(n;¼) 0.28 0.94 0.94 0.75 0.81 0.84
½(n;w) -0.30 0.97 0.97 0.35 0.27 0.42
5 Phillips Curves: Responses to a monetary shock
5.1 A Traditional Phillips Curve
Through the addition of labour market frictions, the fair wage models
generate structural unemployment. As such, it is possible to rearrange the
Philips curve to show the relationship between changes in the nominal wage
and unemployment in the spirit of Phillips' original work (Phillips, 1958).
Change in the nominal wage is de¯ned as
¢ ^ wt = wt + pt ¡ wt¡1 ¡ pt¡1
= wt ¡ wt¡1 + ¼t:
Thus, the expression for employment (25) can be expressed as
°nt = Ã(¢ ^ wt ¡ ¼t):
21Making use of the relationship between employment and unemployment
(28), rearranging the preceding equation for ¼t and substituting these
into the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve gives the following
relationship between changes in nominal wage and unemployment for the
¯rst speci¯cation of the fair wage model















(24) shows that changes in the nominal wage are negatively related to
unemployment and are also a function of marginal cost. Owing to the wage
rigidity in the model, the wage-unemployment relationship is augmented
by considerations for future wage changes and unemployment.
Figure 3(a) plots the relationship between changes in the nominal
wage and unemployment in response to a monetary policy shock for all
speci¯cations of the fair wage model. The data points at the bottom right
corner of the ¯gure correspond to log deviations of the series from steady
state on impact of shock. The data points then follow a counter-clockwise
path back to steady state. The extra persistence created by consumption
and social norm habit formation and price indexing in speci¯cations II and
III of the models can be seen in speed of adjustment of the nominal wage
back to steady state. The initial speci¯cation returns to steady state after
two periods, one period ahead of the other models. All of the models slightly
overshoot the nominal wage steady state before gradually returning after
around 15-18 periods. The magnitude of the e®ect on unemployment is far
more pronounced. Unemployment increases by roughly the same amount
in each speci¯cation of the model. Once more, the ¯rst speci¯cation
of the model returns to the steady state around one period ahead of
the alternative speci¯cations. The unemployment series moves below its
steady state level, before converging back to steady state after 10-12 periods.
5.2 New-Keynesian Phillips Curve
Figure 3(b) replicates the preceding ¯gure for the standard new-Keynesian
Phillips curve expressed as an output-in°ation relationship. In this ¯gure,
the data points in the bottom left corner show the movements in output
and in°ation away from steady state upon impact of the shock. The data
points follow a clockwise path back toward steady state. Once again, the
greater persistence generated by the second and third speci¯cations of the
fair wage models can be observed in the models' convergence back to the
steady state. All of the models overshoot the steady state output level
after output initially falls after the tightening of monetary policy. The ¯rst
22speci¯cation of the model shows a smaller fall in output and returns to
steady state the ¯rst time after one period, whereas the other two models
return after around four periods. Output falls back to its steady state level
after around 7 periods for the ¯rst speci¯cation, and after 12-13 periods for
the other two models. In°ation only slightly overshoots its steady state in
speci¯cations of II and III, and returns to steady state around 2-3 periods
earlier in the ¯rst speci¯cation of the model.
23Figure 3: Phillips Curves
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246 Conclusion
In this paper, two sticky price DSGE models were built with one augmented
by an e±ciency wage labour market friction. The e±ciency wage condition
is motivated by a gift exchange relationship between ¯rms and workers
based on fair wage considerations. Households receive disutility from
providing labour e®ort that deviates from a perceived fair level. Firms can
raise productivity by o®ering higher wages, leading the fair wage model
labour market to non-Walrasian outcomes. These models are then extended
to allow for habit formation and price indexing ¯rms.
The reaction of wage and employment to exogenous shocks varies
signi¯cantly between the two models. The fair wage models generate wage
rigidity, which lowers the volatility of the wage response and increases the
volatility of employment response to exogenous shocks. This helps address
a well known de¯ciency of existing business cycle models by reducing the
elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output. The added wage rigidity
also augments the persistence of shocks to the price level. Although the
fair wage and basic models possess identical Phillips curves, they exhibit
di®erent price level responses to shocks. This is due to di®erences in the
behaviour of marginal cost in the presence of labour market frictions.
The persistence of in°ation is signi¯cantly increased in the fair wage
models. Across all speci¯cations of the models, the fair wage models
generate greater ampli¯cation and persistence of exogenous shocks. The
second order moments of the models further show the improved performance
of the models with labour market frictions.
Results found elsewhere in the literature have shown that fair wage
considerations improve the performance of business cycle models (Collard &
de la Croix, 2000; Danthine & Kurmann, 2004). This paper has corroborated
these ¯ndings using Australian data. Furthermore, it has shown that these
conclusions extend to estimated models.
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Appendix A: Log-Linearised Equations
Fair Wage Model
Making use of the model's steady state relationships and log-linearising
around the steady state, the following sytem of equations is obtained3;4
°nt = Ã(wt ¡ wt¡1): (25)
yt = Et(yt+1 + ¼t+1) ¡ xt ¡ it: (26)





yt = at + nt: (29)




it = ¿it¡1 + (1 ¡ ¿)(Á¼¼t + Á~ ye yt) + ºt; (31)












xt = ½¨xt¡1 + "x;t; (34)
at = ½aat¡1 + "A;t: (35)
Basic Model
In the basic model, the equation for unemployment is removed and (25) is
replaced by




Output under °exible prices becomes
y
f
t = at +
xt
(½¨ ¡ 1)(# + 1)
: (37)
3Note that in (26) xt = Et(Àt+1) ¡ Àt = (½¨ ¡ 1)Àt. This new expression for the





Fair Wage Model II: Hybrid Phillips Curve and Consumption
Habit Case



























+ wt + (1 ¡ b)(byt¡1 ¡ yt)
¶
: (40)















Fair Wage Model III: Social Norm Persistence
Under this new speci¯cation of the model, (25) becomes




t = (1 ¡ ¹)ws
t¡1 + ¹wt¡1: (43)











t¡1 + ¹at¡1): (44)
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